Rivalry and uncertainty in complementary investments with dynamic market sharing

Collection Location Koleksi E-book & E-Journal Perpustakaan Pusat Unila
Edition vol.271issue 2
Call Number
ISBN/ISSN 15729338
Author(s) Azevedo, Alcino
Paxson, Dean
Subject(s) Business and Management
Classification NONE
Series Title
GMD E-Journal
Language English
Publisher Springer
Publishing Year 2018
Publishing Place Switzerland
Abstract/Notes Abstract We study the effects of revenue and investment cost uncertainty, as well nonpreemptionduopolycompetition,onthetimingofinvestmentsintwocomplementaryinputs, where either spillover-knowledge is allowed or proprietary-knowledge holds. We find that the ex-ante and ex-post revenue market shares play a very important role in firms’ behavior. When competition is considered, the leader’s behavior departs from that of the monopolist firm of Smith (Ind Corp Change 14:639–650, 2005). The leader is justified in following the conventionalwisdom(i.e.,synchronousinvestmentsaremorelikely),whereas,thefollower’s behavior departs from that of the conventional wisdom (i.e., asynchronous investments are more likely). Keywords Complementaryinvestments·Duopoly·Investmentanalysis·Non-preemption· Real option game·Uncertainty
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