Technology transfer with search intensity and project advertising

Collection Location Koleksi E-book & E-Journal Perpustakaan Pusat Unila
Edition Online First Articles
Call Number
ISBN/ISSN 1573 7047
Author(s)  Calcagnini, Giorgio...[et al]
Subject(s) Business and Management
Classification NONE
Series Title
GMD E-Journal
Language English
Publisher Springer
Publishing Year
Publishing Place Switzerland
Collation
Abstract/Notes Abstract We present a model where technology transfer (TT) is embedded into a non cooperative model of utility and profit maximization and is the result of an endogenous matching process between technology transfer offices and innovative firms. We show that TT strictly depends on the costs of searching researchers and firm advertising for vacant projects. In this scenario, technology progress might be excessively low if technology transfer offices search for project matches too much intensively. The result occurs because both sides of the market ignore the externalities of their decisions. Complementarity or substitutability between the tightness in the TT market and the technology stock are both potential equilibrium outcomes. Keywords Technology transfer · Matching · Externalities
Specific Detail Info
Image
  Back To Previous