||ABSTRACT. The ﬁrst judgment of the International Criminal Court, delivered on 9 March 2012, raises a pivotal and equally controversial issue of what constitutes active participationinhostilities’forthepurposeofthechildsolideroﬀencesundertheRome Statute in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. The Majority (Judge Fulford and JudgeBlattmann)adoptedabroaddeﬁnitionofthenotionofactive’participationand the Minority (Judge Benito) an even more ample one. This was achieved by distinguishing between active participation in hostilities’ and direct participation in hostilities’andbyrecourseto thetravauxpre ´paratoiresoftheRomeStatuteandtohuman rights norms. The purpose of this contribution is to demonstrate that the meaning of active participation in hostilities’ under Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute is not ambiguous or obscure, but is the same as that of direct participationinhostilities’underinternationalhumanitarianlaw.Recoursetosupplementary means of interpretation by the Trial Chamber, be it to the travaux pre ´paratoires, or to human rights norms, was unnecessary and misguided. The contribution will also draw someconclusionsonhowcriminalliabilitybeforetheICCmaybeexcludedforArticles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) or 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute on the basis of the broad deﬁnition adopted by the Trial Chamber of the notion of active participation in hostilities’ and will discuss other consequences arising from the judgement at hand.