HOLDING TO ACCOUNT A POSSIBLE EUROPEAN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

Collection Location	Koleksi E-book & E-Journal Perpustakaan Pusat Unila
Edition	vol 24 issue 3
Call Number
ISBN/ISSN	1572 9850
Author(s)	CONWAY, GERARD
Subject(s)	LAW
Classification	NONE
Series Title
GMD	E-Journal
Language
Publisher	Springer
Publishing Year	2013
Publishing Place
Collation
Abstract/Notes	ABSTRACT. The Lisbon Treaty provides a legal basis for the Member States of the European Union (EU) to establish a European Public Prosecutor (EPP) with competence to prosecute, in the courts of the Member States, crimes against the financial interests of the Union. Article 86 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, provides that the Member States may unanimously, or through flexible cooperation where nine Member States agree, establish such a European-level prosecution body, with the possibility for its powers to be extended by unanimity to include serious crime having a cross border dimension or affecting more than one Member State. Within the legal traditions of the Member States, means of holding prosecution authorities to account vary considerably. Probably the strongest form of accountability exists in the civil law tradition of Member States that permit appeals to judicial bodiesfordecisionsnottoprosecute,whichcontrastswiththetraditionalcommonlaw reluctance to even give reasons for not prosecuting. Similarly, the ways in which prosecutionauthoritiesinteractoroverlapwithpolicefunctions,andthuswithgeneral mechanismsofpoliceand/orbureaucraticaccountability,differ.Someoftheparticular featuresofEUcooperationsuggestadditionalaccountabilityissues,notably,questions concerning competence spill-over and problems of remoteness. This paper seeks to addresshowtoconceptualise governanceandaccountabilityofapossibleEPPoutside of the context of a trial (the latter entailing a type of open legal accountability that can bestudiedinitsownright)andincludingthequestionofthedefinitionofcompetences
Specific Detail Info
Image
	Back To Previous